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"[Classical thermodynamics] is the only theory of universal content concerning which I am convinced that, within the framework of the applicability of its basic concepts, it will never be overthrown." (Einstein 1970, p. 33) This is a quite common opinion about thermodynamics. 

However, Maxwell thought otherwise. Maxwell (1867) devised his famous thought experiment known as Maxwell's Demon in the setting of classical mechanics as a counterexample of the Second Law of thermodynamics. He realized that a truly mechanistic world view has consequences that are incompatible with thermodynamics. Since the theoretical tools needed to derive his insight from the principles of mechanics were not available to Maxwell, he offered his picturesque thought experiment. Since Maxwell, writers agreeing with Einstein have made numerous attempts to counter Maxwell's argument (see Leff and Rex 2003). Most of these attempts have focused on the construction of various Demonic devices, and the rejection of Maxwell's idea was based on the details of these devices. We believe that focusing on those details obscured the heart of the matter. 

Until recently no general proof or disproof of Maxwell's idea was given. Albert (2000, Ch. 5) has given a general argument that a Demon is compatible with the principles of mechanics thus supporting Maxwell.​[1]​ Our discussion in this paper follows and extends Albert's argument in the most general terms, and refrains from examining particular devices. We will argue that a Maxwellian Demon is compatible not only with the principles of mechanics, but also with the principles of statistical mechanics. 

The question whether a Maxwellian Demon is a counterexample of the Second Law consists of two questions. One is whether the Demon is compatible with mechanics (or statistical mechanics), and the other is whether statistical mechanics underwrites thermodynamics. In this paper we address the first question. As regards the second question, we believe that in some important sense thermodynamics can be underwritten by statistical mechanics, but we don't address this question here.
 
The question of Maxwell's Demon raises and illustrates several important philosophical issues about the project of statistical mechanics in general. If we take seriously the idea that the world can be described completely by a mechanical theory, then we must be able to explain our experience and to make sense of probabilistic considerations on the basis of mechanics. In this paper we propose such an account of probability and of our experience, and we show that this account gives rise to a Maxwellian Demon. In this sense, the Demon is an outcome of taking mechanics seriously.​[2]​ Another outcome of our analysis of the Demon applies to the entropy cost of information processing. We show that the famous Landuar-Bennett thesis concerning this cost is false.





2.1 Setting the stage. The Demon in Maxwell's original thought experiment decreases the entropy of the gas by separating particles according to their speed. The Demon manipulates the gate between two chambers thereby allowing the fast particles to enter one chamber and the slow ones to enter the other. Consequently, whereas initially the states of the particles are distributed according to the Maxwell-Boltzmann energy distribution, the final distribution is different. By this thought experiment Maxwell captured an intuition which we shall now explain in general terms. 

The state of a classical mechanical system is represented by a point in the system's phase space Γ at a given time. Γ contains a subspace consisting of all the microstates that are consistent with external constraints which may include boundary conditions such as volume, and limitations such as total energy (see Figure 1a). This is the system's accessible region.​[3]​ Some of the constraints may change with time.  But the actual state of the system at any given time is necessarily confined to the region which is accessible to it at that time.
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The time evolution of the system is given by a trajectory in phase space which is a continuous sequence of points obeying the classical equations of motion. A useful tool in mechanics is to consider the time evolution of a set of points (call them dynamical blobs) corresponding to various possible states of the system at a given time. The time evolution of these points is given by a bundle of trajectories. By Liouville's theorem the Lebesgue measure of a dynamical blob is conserved under the dynamics although its shape may change over time (see Figure 1a).

Γ is also partitioned into sub regions which form the set of macrostates (see Figure 1b).​[4]​ Macrostates correspond to the values of some classical macroscopic observables.​[5]​ By this term we mean sets of microstates each of which forms an equivalence group which reflects measurement or resolution capabilities of some observer (human or other).​[6]​ A system is said to be in a given macrostate at time t if its actual microstate at t (which is a point in the dynamical blob at t) belongs to that macrostate.​[7]​ In these terms, statistical mechanics describes the relationship between the time evolution of the dynamical blobs and the macrostates. Figure 1c illustrates the way in which an observer with the resolution capabilities given by Figure 1b sees the dynamical evolution of Figure 1a. The distinction between a dynamical blob and a macrostate has implications with respect to the notion of probability in statistical mechanics to which we now turn.

Suppose that we measure the size of sets of microstates in Γ by some measure, say the Lebesgue measure. We now define the probability of a macrostate at a given time t1 relative to an initial macrostate at t0 as follows (see Figure 2). Take a system S in an initial macrostate I at t0. This means that the dynamical blob of S at t0 (call it B) coincides with the macrostate I. Consider the time evolution of B from t0 to t1. At time t1, the time evolved B partially overlaps some of the macrostates of S. The probability at t1 of each macrostate is given by the relative Lebesgue measure of the subset of B which belongs to that macrostate at time t1. This definition of probability seems to us to fit the aim of statistical mechanics, which is to give macroscopic probabilistic predictions for finite times based on the dynamics of the system and on any macroscopic information we may have about the system. Indeed, the definition above seems to us the only definition of probability that satisfies this aim.​[8]​

Under which conditions the Lebesgue measure of a macrostate can be identified with its probability at time t in the above sense? In the above terms the answer is clear. The conditions are such that the dynamical blob should be spread at time t over the accessible region in such a way that the Lebesgue measure of the blob's parts contained in the different macrostates are proportional to the Lebesgue measure of the macrostates themselves. A dynamical evolution during a time interval ∆t that satisfies this condition we shall call normal.​[9]​ Of course, this condition depends on the shape of the blob at every moment of time, i.e. on the way the shape changes by the dynamics. In other words, whether or not an evolution is normal during a given time interval depends on the way in which the dynamical blob spreads over a given set of macrostates. 

In these terms, one of the most important projects in the foundations of statistical mechanics is to find out what are the details of the dynamical conditions under which the probability of a macrostate coincides with its Lebesgue measure. In general even if at some time the probability of a macrostate coincides with its Lebesgue measure, there is no guarantee that this condition will hold at other times. This is essentially the significance of the objections by Loschmidt and by Zermelo to Boltzmann's early theory.                  
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2.2 Construction of a Demon. Consider the phase space Γ of some isolated subsystem S of the universe illustrated in Figure 2. Each point in Γ describes a microstate of S. We divide the degrees of freedom of S into three sets: D, G and E (for Demon, Gas and Environment, respectively). We assume throughout that these subsystems, and in particular the Demon, are purely mechanical systems that invariably satisfy all the laws of the underlying mechanical theory, i.e. in our case classical mechanics. This means that the properties of D, G and E are taken to be fully described in the phase space of S (by means of the generalized position and momentum and their functions), and they evolve in time in accordance with the deterministic and time reversal invariant classical dynamics. In this sense the Demon is, indeed, not supernatural as emphasized by Maxwell (1868) himself.​[10]​  

Take now the phase space Γ of S and consider its partition to the macrostates. Suppose that S is initially prepared in the macrostate I. This means that initially the dynamical blob B coincides with I. Let the microdynamics be such that the dynamical blob B evolves after a finite time interval ∆t=τ, in such a way that at time t=τ B coincides with the region F which is the union of the three macrostates F1, F2 and F3. This means that if S starts out in some microstate in I at t=0 then, at time t=τ, the microstate of S will be in one of the regions F1, F2 or F3. If, say, S ends up in F1, then F2 and F3 contain only points that belong to counterfactual trajectory segments. Such a microdynamics is compatible with Liouville's theorem, since the sum of the volumes of the Fi states, F1+F2+F3, is equal to (or larger than) the volume of I. Figure 2 illustrates the simple case in which the volume of F1+F2+F3 is equal to the volume of I. 

A dynamical evolution of this sort is Demonic, if the Lebesgue measure of each of the Fi states is smaller than the measure of I. The reason is two fold. (i) This evolution is entropy reducing since the entropy of S at time t is defined as the logarithm of the Lebesgue measure of the macrostate of S at time t. (ii) The probability for decrease of entropy for the system that starts out in macrostate I is higher than the Lebesgue measure of the Fi states. By contrast, if the evolution were normal during ∆t (as defined above), the trajectories that start out in I would roughly spread all over the accessible region at time t=τ, and therefore the probability that S would evolve from I to F during ∆t would be proportional to the Lebesgue measure of F. 

Let us sum up. By the concept of probability in statistical mechanics described above, the probabilities we assign to the macro behavior of a system should be dictated by the behavior of the trajectories over time, and in particular by the behavior of finite segments of trajectories that start out at time t0 in some known initial macrostate I. At any given time t>t0 the macroscopic behavior of S is determined by the overlap in Γ of the time evolved blob at time t and the various regions corresponding to macrostates in Γ. As we said before, the dynamical evolution of S is normal if and only if the measure of the finite segments that start out in I at time t0 and arrive at each macrostate Fi at time t is proportional to the Lebesgue measure of each of the Fi. Since in our construction of the Demon the probability that S arrives into any given Fi is higher then the Lebesgue measure of Fi, the dynamics is Demonic in precisely the sense that it reduces the entropy of S with probability higher than the Lebesgue measure of Fi.

Up to now we showed that the Demonic evolution of S is compatible with the principles of classical mechanics, in particular with Liouville's theorem. Let us now explain how the Demonic evolution is compatible also with the probabilistic assertions of statistical mechanics. 

Once it is realized that probabilities and dynamics are intertwined in the way described above two crucial points immediately follow. First, the Demonic evolution is compatible with any probability distribution over initial conditions, say, the distribution over the microstates in the initial macrostate I. Second, it is compatible with what we called a normal evolution in the following sense. Recall that a normal evolution means that after a finite time ∆Tn the probability of any macrostate M is proportional to the Lebesgue measure of M. Given a normal evolution it is possible to tailor Hamiltonians that will be Demonic for times ∆t=τ shorter than the time interval ∆Tn, and still be normal at time Tn.​[11]​ This means that our Demon is consistent with some standard probabilistic assumptions of statistical mechanics.

We conclude from this discussion that a Demon is possible. Let now explain what we mean by the term possible. First, as we said, a Demon is possible in the sense that it is consistent with the principles of statistical mechanics. Second, a Demon is possible in the sense that it is conceivable that some future segment of the actual evolution of the universe (or of some isolated subsystem of it) will be Demonic. By saying that such an evolution is conceivable we mean that it is perfectly consistent with all our past experience. In other words, it might be that the past macroscopic behavior of the universe (as we know it) is not indicative of its future macroscopic behavior, and yet the principles of statistical mechanics hold at all times. That is, it might be that in the short term the evolution will be Demonic although the long term evolution will be normal. This is an instance of the under-determination of the future macro-behavior by its past macro-behavior, and even as a case of Goodman's Grue paradox. 

Finally, let us redescribe the Demonic evolution in traditional terms concerning Maxwell's Demon. The partition of Γ into the macrostates I and F1, F2 and F3 shows that there is a difference in the way that the entropies of the subsystems D, G and E change in the course of the evolution from I to Fi. Consider the subspace of S consisting of the G degrees of freedom, which is represented in Figure 2 by the G axis. Take the projection of the macrostate of S onto this subspace; and call the measure of this projection, relative to this subspace,​[12]​ the entropy of the gas; and similarly for the D and E subspaces and entropies. The measure of the projection of I on G (relative to the subspace G) is larger than the measure of the projection of any of the Fi regions (F1 or F2 or F3) on G, and this means that the entropy of G decreases with certainty, so that the gas ends up in a certain predictable low entropy macrostate. The entropy of D, by contrast, is unchanged by this dynamics: The projections of I, F1, F2 and F3 on D all have the same measure. The macrostate of E is also unchanged throughout the evolution. Thus, the entropy of the gas has decreased whereas the entropy of the Demon and of the environment have been conserved. And since this outcome has been perfectly macroscopically predictable, it is a Demonic evolution. (We discuss the question of completing the operation cycle below.) 


2.3 Remarks on topology. In the Demonic set up illustrated in Figure 2 the F region (consisting of the three macrostates Fi) is topologically connected. Albert's original set up is different (see Figure 3). In his set up the dynamics is such that the region F consists of topologically disconnected regions (the Fi's). Since the dynamical transformation is continuous and time reversal invariant, this construction implies that the region I must also consist of three topologically disconnected regions. In fact, if the F regions are topologically disconnected (as in Albert's set up), then the whole of phase space is decomposable into dynamically disconnected regions.​[13]​ This means that the dynamics in this case is not ergodic in the Birkhoff-Von Neumann sense of the term, and this is the reason why we prefer our set up of Figure 2 (in which the phase space can be metrically-indecomposable and the dynamics can be ergodic in this sense).
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The above construction shows that a Demon is possible. However, the classical dynamics imposes two restrictions on the efficiency of the Demonic universe, as follows.

3.1 Efficiency vs. predictability. In the above scenarios (Figure 2 and 3) of the Demon there is a trade off between a reliable entropy decrease and macroscopic predictability.​[14]​ This has been stressed by Albert (2000, Ch. 5). We want now to draw another linkage, namely a linkage between the predictability of the Demonic evolution and the efficiency of the Demon in reducing entropy. By efficiency of an operation we mean the entropy difference between the initial and final macrostates.
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Consider one of the microstate points in the I macrostate, call it x (see Figure 4). In a Demonic evolution, as described above, this point must sit on a trajectory that takes it to a microstate (call it y) in one of the F macrostates (say, F1) after τ seconds. Consider now the microstates which are the velocity reversals of x and y, call them –x and –y respectively. In many interesting cases (but certainly not all cases​[15]​), microstates which are the velocity reversals of each other belong to the same macrostate. Suppose, then that both x and –x belong to I, and similarly, both y and –y belong to F1. This puts constraints on the efficiency and macroscopic predictability of the Demonic evolution. Let's see why.

Since the dynamics is time reversal invariant, if the trajectory starting out in x in I takes S to the microstate y in F1, then the trajectory that starts out in –y in F1 takes S back to the microstate –x in I after τ seconds. As the mapping from x in I to y in F1 reduces the entropy of S, the reversed evolution from –y in F to –x in I increases the entropy of S. However, if S starts off in I and evolves to, say, F1 (thereby decreasing its entropy), we want it to remain in the low entropy state F1, avoiding points like –y which take S back to the high entropy state I after τ seconds. To make S remain in F1 we can do one of the following things: 

(i) Stability vs. efficiency. We can increase the volume of each of the Fi states (while keeping their number fixed) and thereby increase the total volume of the F region. In this case, the relative measure of the set of –y points in F1 will decrease, and so the probability of F1-to-I evolutions will similarly decrease. The reason is that F1 will include longer trajectory segments which map F1 to itself. But the larger the volume of F1, the smaller is the entropy difference between I and F1. Here, there is a trade off between the efficiency of the Demon (i.e. the amount of entropy decrease) and the stability of the low entropy state. 

(ii) Stability vs. predictability (for a given efficiency). We can increase the number of the F states (given a fixed measure of each of the Fi states), so that each of F1, F2, F3, F4,… etc. will still have a small volume (relative to the volume of I), but the total volume of the F region will increase. In this case, the measure of trajectories that arrive at each of the Fi's will be small relative to the volume of the Fi's. The entropy of S will decrease in every cycle of operation, and moreover the low entropy final state will be relatively stable. However, as the number of the Fi states increases, the macroscopic evolution of S becomes less predictable. So here there is a trade off between the stability of the low entropy state and the macroscopic predictability. 

(iii) According to the optimal interplay between the three factors: stability, predictability and efficiency, we can combine strategies (i) and (ii), i.e. increase the measure of each of the Fi states and their number. It is easy to see this interplay by focusing on the special case in which the volume of I is equal to the total volume of the Fi states (as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3). In this case, no matter how much we increase the number of the Fi states, since their total volume is equal to that of I, it follows from the time reversal of the dynamics that the trajectory of S will oscillate between the I and Fi states with frequency 1/2τ. Note that the Lebesgue measure of the x-type points is equal to the measure of the –x-type points, since the time reversal operation is measure preserving. Yet, none of these constraints undermines the fact that the above scenarios correspond to genuine Demonic evolutions.

3.2 Preparation. In order to display a Demonic behavior as in the above scenarios, S must start out in macrostate I. Once it reaches the state I it will evolve Demonically spontaneously in the way we spelled out above. But note that S will exhibit the Demonic behavior only if and when it reaches macrostate I. How can S arrive into this initial macrostate?  It is a consequence of Liouville's theorem that the measure of I cannot be greater than 1/2 of the measure of the entire accessible region.​[16]​ Any macrostate whose measure is small enough can be part of a Demonic set up. Yet, since the universe is in a low entropy state right now, this constraint does not really undermine the possibility that the universe will evolve Demonically in the future.

4. Completing the operation cycle

By the definition we gave earlier, a system is Demonic if its entropy decreases with probability higher than that determined by the standard measures of the initial and final macrostates. However, some writers argue that this is not sufficient: they add the requirement that an evolution be considered Demonic only if in addition the cycle of operation is completed.​[17]​ We don't want to go into the question of whether or not this requirement is justified. Instead, we will show now how it can be satisfied by our construction.

4.1 Three requirements. What is a completion of an operation cycle? Once the cycle is completed we don't want the system to return exactly to its initial state, since in particular we want the entropy of the gas to remain low. Instead, the idea is that at the end of the cycle the situation will be as follows. Take our total system S consisting of the degrees of freedom D, G and E. G must end up with entropy lower than its initial entropy, while D and E must end up with entropy not higher than their initial entropy. D must end up in its original initial macrostate as well as retain its initial entropy. E, by contrast, must retain its initial entropy, but it may end up in a macrostate that is different from its initial macrostate. This latter requirement is in accordance with the standard literature. For example, Bennett (1973, 1987) and Szilard (1929) argue that completing the cycle of operation involves dissipation in the environment, and therefore the environment's final macrostate is a fortiori different from its initial macrostate. (For them not only the macrostate of the environment changes, but the entropy of the environment increases; we allow for a different macrostate, but entropy is conserved.) Moreover, the overall final state (at the end of the operation cycle) of S must be such that a subsequent entropy reducing operation cycle can start off, and once the second operation is completed, another one can start off, and then another, perpetually. These requirements are often stated in terms of three properties that the final macrostate of S (at the end of the operation cycle) should have: 

(i) Low entropy. The total entropy of S at the end of the operation cycle must be lower than its entropy in the initial macrostate I.   
(ii) Reurn of D to Ready state. At the end of the operation cycle D must return to its initial ready macrostate, so that a new cycle of operation can start off. 
(iii) Erased memory. The final macrostate of S at the end of the operation cycle must be macroscopically uncorrelated to the F macrostates. In other words, at the end of the cycle there should be no macroscopic records of whatever sort that will allow retrodicting which state among F1, F2 and F3 was the actual macrostate of S prior to the erasure. Obviously, the requirement of erasure refers to the macroscopic level, since the classical microdynamics is incompatible with erasure at the microscopic level, because it is deterministic and time reversal invariant.​[18]​ Note that requirement (iii) is stronger than requirement (ii), since the memory could be stored in systems other than D. 

Before we proceed to showing how all these requirements can be achieved, it will be instructive to consider two attempts that don't work. The first attempt doesn't obey Liouville's theorem and the second increases entropy. 

Consider a dynamics which takes S from I to one of the Fi states (as before; see Figure 5). Then: S evolves to a macrostate A3 (see Figure 5a) such that D goes back to its initial state (requirement ii) while leaving G in its low entropy state (requirement i), and E is unchanged. Such a process erases memory (requirement iii) since from the final macrostate A3 it is impossible to retrodict which among F1, F2 and F3 was the previous macrostate of S. However, the process violates Liouville's theorem, since it maps F1+F2+F3 into A3 whose volume is smaller than the volume of F1+F2+F3. Therefore such a process is impossible. This, in essence, is the difficulty addressed by Landauer (1961).  
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The second attempt maps the macrostates F1, F2 and F3 to the region A (see Figure 5b), where region A has the following properties. It contains all the microstates to which the trajectories leaving F will arrive after τ' seconds (thus obeying Liouville's theorem); G retains its low entropy state, and D returns to its initial ready state (requirement ii). Memory is erased since from the information that S is in macrostate A, it is impossible to infer the Fi state in which it has been before (requirement iii). However, due to Liouville's theorem, the entropy of E increases, and so the final entropy of S is the same as the initial entropy in macrostate I. The achievement of reducing the entropy by the transformation from I to one of the macrostates F1 or F2 or F3 is lost, contrary to requirement (i).

We now turn to show, by way of construction, how requirements (i), (ii) and (iii) can be achieved without violating any principle of mechanics.     
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4.2 Low entropy and return to ready state. We begin with requirements (i) of low entropy and (ii) return to the ready state. Consider Figure 6. The region A is partitioned into three disjoint macrostates A1, A2 and A3 such that the union of their volumes is at least as large as the union of the volumes of F1, F2 and F3. In the simplest case, illustrated in Figure 6, the volumes of A1, A2 and A3 are all the same and are equal to the volumes of F1, F2 and F3. We now require that the dynamics maps the Fi states (after a certain time interval) to the Ai states.​[19]​ The actual final state of S will be one of the Ai macrostates, and the volume of that macrostate is, by construction, equal to the volume of each of the Fi macrostates and smaller than the volume of the initial macrostate I. This means that the total entropy of S during the evolution from F to A does not change and in particular it does not increase. So the evolution satisfies requirement (i) of low entropy.​[20]​
 
Let us see now what this entropy conserving transformation implies for the three subsystems separately: G, D and E. The Ai macrostates are chosen such that the projection along the G axis is the same as in the Fi macrostates, and so G retains its low entropy. The projection along the D axis is the same as in the initial macrostate I, and so by this dynamics D returns to its initial ready state. So requirement (ii) of return to the ready state is satisfied for D. Moreover, the entropy of D has not changed throughout the process. 

Along the E axis, there are by construction three regions corresponding to three possible final macrostates E1, E2, E3 of E. The entropy of E in each of these macrostates is the same as it was in the initial state I, although its final macrostate is different from its initial one. As we said above the fact that E ends up in a macrostate different from its initial macrostate is not a problem and is in accordance with the standard requirements in the literature (see e.g. Bennett (1973, 1987) and Szilard (1929). Moreover, we can construct the evolution from F to A such that the entropy of E will decrease by taking a partition of A into more numerous and smaller subsets. In this case, obviously, E not only need not but cannot return to its initial macrostate. So requiring that it will return to its initial state is absolutely superfluous.  
	
4.3 Memory erasure. We will now show, by explicit and general phase space construction, that it is possible to construe the A macrostates such that our dynamics will result in a genuine memory erasure without increasing the total entropy of S or violating Liouville's theorem.

So far, nothing in our construction corresponds to memory erasure since it is possible that the A1, A2 and A3 macrostates are 1:1 correlated to the F1, F2 and F3 macrostates, so that from the final A macrostate it is possible to retrodict the F macrostate. However, such a correlation can be easily avoided, as follows. Consider a dynamics such that 1/3 of the points in each of the regions F1, F2 and F3 are mapped into each of the regions A1, A2 and A3. Conversely, by this dynamics, among all the points that arrive into each of the Ai regions from the Fi regions, 1/3 arrive from each of the Fi regions. 

By this construction, the Ai macrostates are not macroscopically correlated to the Fi macrostates, and in this sense they bear no information about their macroscopic history. Given the final Ai macrostate, it is impossible to retrodict the Fi macrostate. In particular, given the Ai macrostate of S, say A1, it is impossible to reconstruct the historical Fi macrostate, since the dynamics maps sub regions of the Fi macrostates to sub regions of the Ai macrostates. Therefore, the F-to-A transformation is a memory erasure and moreover as we just saw it is a dissipationless memory erasure (relative to the carving up of the phase space into the Fi and Ai macrostates). More generally, relative to any given set of macrostates, there is an erasing dynamics (in finite times) of the kind spelled out above which is perfectly compatible with Liouville's theorem and with the requirements of low entropy and return to the ready state. At the same time the actual final Ai state, and in particular the projection of the Ai state onto the E axis, is macroscopically unpredictable given the previous Fi state of S.    

By this construction we have demonstrated that the cycle of operation in a Demonic evolution can be completed, in the right sense of completion. The initial and final macrostates of S are indeed different, namely, by the end of each cycle the number of macrostates of E is (in our set up) tripled. But this is absolutely irrelevant to the questions of Maxwell's Demon and memory erasure. More generally, our construction shows that the exponential increase in the number of macrostates is perfectly compatible with a reliable and regular and repeatable entropy decrease and genuine memory erasure.     

According to the Landauer-Bennett thesis, memory erasure is necessarily accompanied by a compensating entropy increase of kln2 per bit of lost information. Landauer and Bennett base their thesis on Liouville's theorem (see Bennett 2003, Landauer 1961, Leff and Rex 2003 and Shenker 2004). Our F-to-A dynamics is a counterexample which directly refutes the thesis. 
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"The law that entropy always increases, - the second law of thermodynamics – holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature….[I]f your theory is found to be against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation." (Eddington 1935, p. 81)

We believe that Eddington is wrong. We have shown that Maxwell's Demon is compatible with classical statistical mechanics, and we believe that if statistical mechanics disagrees with thermodynamics, then statistical mechanics prevails. Taking the dynamics seriously means in particular that: (i) Probability in statistical mechanics supervenes on the dynamics; (ii) The partition of the phase space into macrostates is fundamentally determined by the dynamics since it hinges on the correlations between the states of observers and observed systems (we did not expand on this point). (iii) Accepting that Maxwellian Demons are possible.     

Nevertheless, if we take our experience as a guide, we cannot construct Demons. But how can we explain this, given that Maxwellian Demons are in principle possible? Maxwellian Demons are possible in cases where there is the right sort of harmony between the dynamics (the evolution of the dynamical blobs) and the partition of the phase space into macrostates. One can construct Demons either by finding the right sort of dynamical evolution to match a given set of macrostates (by constructing the Hamiltonian), or by finding the right set of macrostates to match a given dynamics (by constructing the right measuring devices).​[23]​ If we could achieve such a Demonic harmony, we could extract work from heat, and contrary to the Landauer-Bennett thesis, perform a logically irreversible computation without dissipation. 

As of now, it seems to us that the difficulties in actually constructing a Demonic system involve practical issues such as controlling a large number of degrees of freedom, interventionist considerations​[24]​, etc. Since the issues involved are merely practical, ruling out the possibility of the Demon in advance on the basis of, say, the Second Law of thermodynamics, begs the question. The fact that in the past Demons have not been observed certainly does not entail by itself that Demons will not be observed or constructed in the future.​[25]​ 
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^1	  Albert's argument is in the framework of a Boltzmannian-style approach to statistical mechanics. Defending this approach is beyond the scope of this paper. Some arguments are given in Albert (2000), Goldstein (2001), Callender (1999), Lebowitz (1999) and Hemmo and Shenker 2006. See Uffink (2004) for a critical historical introduction to Boltzmann's work and references. Albert's argument has no counterpart in the Gibbsian framework to statistical mechanics since the argument hinges on the Boltzmannian notion of entropy as the phase space volume of a macrostate. 
^2	  In other words, we don't take thermodynamics too seriously (see Callender 2001).
^3	 If the dynamics is such that the region accessible to the system is metrically decomposable into dynamically disjoint regions each with positive measure (as in KAM's theorem; see Walker and Ford 1969), we can consider the effectively accessible region as determined by the system's initial state.
^4	  The partition of Γ into macrostates can be described by a mapping that determines the region to which any point in Γ belongs and that satisfies two conditions. (a) All the subsets of Γ in this partition are given by some measurable function defined over Γ. This condition is necessary in order to make sense of the idea that the entropy of a system is the measure of its macrostate. (b) The measurable subsets have to be disjoint and cover all of Γ. That is, each point must belong to one, and only one, measurable set of points in Γ. This condition ensures that the system has well defined macroscopic properties at all times.
^5	  Macroscopic classical observables are not: (i) the micro-observables of generalized position and momentum; (ii) quantum mechanical observables.  
^6	  This idea is expressed for example by Tolman (1938, p. 167), although Tolman usually works in a Gibssian framework. For example, in Boltzmann's original work (as interpreted by Ehrenfests???) the macrostates in Γ express equivalence groups in μ space relative to some given resolution power with respect to a molecular state.  
^7	   The thermodynamic magnitudes are defined only for equilibrium states. A general theory of macrostates would have to give precise definitions of the macroscopic observables in terms of microphysical correlations and equivalence groups thereof that obtain between the observer states and the states of the observed systems. This is the sense in which we understand the term macroscopic observable in the classical context.      
^8	  Arguing for this view will take us way beyond the scope of this paper. But let us hint on our reasons for this choice. (i) Approaches based on behavior in the infinite time limit (e.g. ergodicity) don't yield predictions for finite times, since any finite time behavior is compatible with ergodicity. (ii) Approaches based on ignorance or combinatorial considerations cannot justify the choice of the measure relative to which probability is distributed and are incompatible with the locality of classical mechanics. (iii) The future macrostate depends dynamically and probabilistically on the present (or past) macrostate, and therefore probabilistic predictions must take the latter into account. In other words, the probabilities we are after are supposed to predict and explain macroscopic behavior for finite times, and are conditional on present information. 
^9	  A uniform probability distribution at time t is a special case of the final state of what we call a normal evolution.
^10	 See Shenker (1999) for a discussion of issues related to this point, such as free choice, control, etc..
^11	  Note that in the dynamical approaches of Boltzmann's equation and its modern successor, e.g. the thermodynamic limit (Lanford ?) the attempts to derive a monotonic entropy increase concern certain Hamiltonians and certain sets of macrostates. To the extent that they are successful, they show that under these specific conditions the evolution is not Demonic.
^12	  Relative to the whole universe this measure is zero.
^13	  In Albert's set up the dynamics is unstable at both the macro and micro lever, whereas in our set up the dynamics is unstable only at the macro level.  
^14	 To avoid confusion, it is essential that notions such as measurement, prediction etc., be described in purely statistical mechanical terms. This can be done, if we think of prediction for instance, as a sort of computation carried out by a Turing machine, where the machine states and the content of its (long enough but finite) tape are given by the macrostates of D and G, and the evolution between the states and along the tape is determined by the projection of the Universe's dynamics on the corresponding axes.
^15	  Consider, for example, the macrostate in which half of the gas molecules move to the right, something we might feel as wind blowing in the right direction. Relative to the phase space partition that corresponds to our sense, say, this macrostate is easily distinguishable from the case where the wind blows to the left. However, in many cases (consider the air in the room) it is extremely plausible that x is indistinguishable from –x.
^16	  In particular, I cannot be an equilibrium state in the combinatorial sense of the term, since the volume of an equilibrium state usually takes up almost the entire accessible region in the phase space. But see Lavis (2005). 
^17	  For more details concerning the cyclic nature of the Second Law of thermodynamics, see Uffink (2001).
^18	  By contrast, the quantum microdynamics is consistent with memory erasure (requirement (iii). The information carried by the value of a quantum mechanical observable can be erased by measuring a non commuting observable. However, the quantum dynamics cannot satisfy both requirements (ii) and (iii) without violating unitarity. See an example of a quantum erasure in Herzog et al. (1995). Here we only consider a classical erasure. 
^19	 If the regions F1, F2 and F3 are topologically disconnected (as in Albert's set up), then so will be the regions A1, A2 and A3. This will put some constraints on the dynamics of the erasure; see below. Since in our set up the F regions are connected, this problem does not arise.
^20	 Incidentally, there is a partition into smaller and more numerous A macrostates such that the entropy of the final state at the completion of the cycle would be even smaller than it was at t= τ; but this is more than we need right now.
^21	  In our set up, the macrostates F11, F12, F13, etc. need not correspond to topologically disconnected regions (for the same reason we have argued before; see section 2). However, if F1, F2 and F3 are topologically disconnected (as in Albert's set up), then so will be the sub regions of F1, F2 and F3 (i.e. F11, F12, F13, etc.) and the regions A1, A2, A3 and their sub regions A11, A12, A13, etc.
^22	  This is an implication of the locality of classical mechanis.
^23	  Grunbaum argues that: "for any specified ensemble there will plainly be coarse-grainings that make the ensemble's entropy do whatever one likes, at least for finite time intervals." See Sklar 1993 p. 357.
^24	  In quantum mechanics, interventionist constraints would presumably be related to decoherence effects. See Hemmo and Shenker (2001, 2005) on the role of decoherence in statistical mechanics. For interventionism in classical statistical mechanics, see Shenker (2000).
^25	  In the case of erasure, the dissipation of klog2 per bit is so small, that it cannot be currently measured anyway given present technology.   
